Plato’s objection to this proposal (208b) is that it leaves open the possibility that someone could count as having knowledge of the name “Theaetetus” even if they could do no more than write out the letters of the name “Theaetetus” in the right order. Since he can arrange those letters in their correct order (208a9–10), he also has true belief. For all that, insists Plato, he does not have knowledge of the name “Theaetetus. , the letters of the name (207c8-d1), he has an account. Since such a person can enumerate the elements of the complex, i.
Thus the Unitarian Cornford argues that Plato is not rejecting the Heracleitean flux theory of perception. It remains possible that perception is just as Heracleitus describes it. He is rejecting only D1’s claim that knowledge is that sort of perception. Likewise, Cornford suggests, the Protagorean doctrine that “man is the measure of all things” is true provided it is taken to mean only “all things that we perceive.
What I will say, is that many slum inhabitants could be seen and see themselves as in transition. Transition from country to urban. From refugee to worker. The answers are, obviously, hugely diverse and I won’t pretend to be able to tell you. From dispossessed to propertied. If we have said where much of the burgeoning urban majorities live, what about what they do, where they work, and where they are going. From slum dweller to somewhere else.
This is the premise with which each player’s conjectures about what would happen off the equilibrium path of play are inconsistent. Gintis (2009) points out that the apparent paradox does not arise merely from our supposing that both players are economically rational. It rests crucially on the additional premise that each player must know, and reasons on the basis of knowing, that the other player is economically rational. A player has reason to consider out-of-equilibrium possibilities if she either believes that her opponent is economically rational but his hand may tremble or she attaches some nonzero probability to the possibility that he is not economically rational or she attaches some doubt to her conjecture about his utility function. We will return to this issue in Section 7 below. As Gintis also stresses, this issue with solving extensive-form games games for SEP by Zermelo’s algorithm generalizes: a player has no reason to play even a Nash equilibrium strategy unless she expects other players to also play Nash equilibrium strategies.
), players may find themselves led to beat their heads against the imposed limitations rather than find creative and enjoyable means by which to “play along. With respect to more ordinary assertions of authority, e. In an RPG context specifically, it seems not unlikely that increasingly emphatic assertions of hegemonic control of appropriate play and in-game discourse will tend to evoke increasing resistance within play, which is to say that players within the game will tend to challenge strong norms asserted by the game-master (or the game text, the received tradition of appropriate play, etc. Extending from this point, we may note a common tensive relationship between extra-ritual assertions of hegemony over performance on the one hand, and on the other a concomitant counter-balancing of the manipulation of ritual as a site for resistance. “railroading,” the more overt the railroading the greater the tendency to resist; that is, if GM railroading involves providing genuine incentives to follow the predetermined plot structure, resistance may be minimal, while if a GM simply blocks all choices but the “correct” one through ad hoc and increasingly ridiculous means (deus ex machina maneuvers, etc. ) the more forcefully they are expressed. Simply put, it is often the case that as authoritative discourse tries to increase control over what happens within ritual performance externally, resistant elements become increasing empowered within performance and have greater efficacy without. One classic example returns us to Advanced Dungeons and Dragons: the more Gary Gygax asserted his authority and authenticity in laying down constraints about “the right way to play,” the more particular groups and players were drawn either to revise the game, to play other games, or to challenge Gygax’s principles from within play.
RankBrain is one of the “hundreds” of signals that go into an algorithm that determines what results appear on a Google search page and where they are ranked, Corrado said. In the few months it has been deployed, RankBrain has become the third-most important signal contributing to the result of a search query, he said.
When Socrates argues against the Dream Theory (202d8–206b11), it is this entailment that he focuses on. If O is not composite, O cannot be known, but only “perceived” (202b6). Crucially, the Dream Theory says that knowledge of O is true belief about O plus an account of O’s composition. In 201d-202d, the famous passage known as The Dream of Socrates, a two-part ontology of elements and complexes is proposed. , those parts which cannot be further analysed. Parallel to this ontology runs a theory of explanation that claims that to explain, to offer a logos, is to analyse complexes into their elements, i.
The point of representing games using trees can best be grasped by visualizing the use of them in supporting backward-induction reasoning. Of course, not all paths will be possible because the other player has a role in selecting paths too, and won’t take actions that lead to less preferred outcomes for him. Just imagine the player (or analyst) beginning at the end of the tree, where outcomes are displayed, and then working backwards from these, looking for sets of strategies that describe paths leading to them. We will present some examples of this interactive path selection, and detailed techniques for reasoning through these examples, after we have described a situation we can use a tree to model. Since a player’s utility function indicates which outcomes she prefers to which, we also know which paths she will prefer.
Hobbes’s proposed solution to this problem was tyranny. The logic here is identical to that used by an army when it threatens to shoot deserters. The people can hire an agent—a government—whose job is to punish anyone who breaks any promise. If all people know that these incentives hold for most others, then cooperation will not only be possible, but will be the expected norm, and the war of all against all becomes a general peace. So long as the threatened punishment is sufficiently dire then the cost of reneging on promises will exceed the cost of keeping them.
In order to thereby maximize their expected fitness, animals must find optimal trade-offs among various intermediate goods, such as nutrition, security from predation and ability to out-compete rivals for mates. The least controversial game-theoretic modelling has applied the classical form of the theory to consideration of strategies by which non-human animals seek to acquire the basic resource relevant to their evolutionary tournament: opportunities to produce offspring that are themselves likely to reproduce. One explanation for this suggested by Hammerstein is that non-human animals typically have less ability to restrict their interaction partners than do people. Efficient trade-off points among these goods can often be estimated for particular species in particular environmental circumstances, and, on the basis of these estimations, both parametric and non-parametric equilibria can be derived. ) On the other hand, as Hammerstein (2003) observes, reciprocity, and its exploitation and metaexploitation, are much more rarely seen in social non-human animals than game-theoretic modeling would lead us to anticipate. (For examples see Krebs and Davies 1984, Bell 1991, Dugatkin and Reeve 1998, Dukas 1998, and Noe, van Hoof and Hammerstein 2001. Our discussion in the previous section of the importance of correlation for stabilizing game solutions lends theoretical support to this suggestion. Models of this sort have an impressive track record in predicting and explaining independent empirical data on such strategic phenomena as competitive foraging, mate selection, nepotism, sibling rivalry,herding, collective anti-predator vigilance and signaling, reciprocal grooming, and interspecific mutuality (symbiosis).
 Writhing in agony, his arm lost to a sugar mill, slave Francois Makandal had a millenarian vision of glorious free black Haitian cities. ” — John Connor, Children of Guinea: Voodoo, The 1793 Haitian Revolution and After (London: Green Anarchist Books, 2003), p. Dependent on their servants, the plantocracy was helpless as one day their livestock died, the next their domestic animals, finally themselves and their families. 6,000 were killed before Makandal was through. By 1740, Makandal had fled to the Maroons and used their secret networks to build a force of thousands across Haiti, infiltrating every home and plantation and bringing poison to each, adapted from West African lore to local circumstances. “Immediately after his maiming, Makandal affected the role of a prophet and built a considerable following in Northern Limbe.
The exchange stuck with me. She sort of chided me and stated that this was Rand’s primary job but not mine. A year or so ago I mentioned in an email to Jen Lopez how in awe I was at the timely responses I’d get from Rand. It was like comparing apples and oranges. Hell, I’m not even Batman.