May 7th, 2014 – 3:00 PM EDT | Comments Off on Jus Post Bellum Symposium: The Norm of Environmental Integrity in Post-Conflict Legal Regimes http://opiniojuris.
As they defined them at the time, their desired outcomes were outrageous: halt a brutal sectarian civil war, defeat a nationalist-Islamist insurgency, facilitate a political settlement in an ethno-religiously divided synthetic state, and restore essential civil services. In what universe did policymakers expect our means — a finite professional (non-conscripted) army in an alien land with help from the State Department (whose staff globally is about the size of one army division) — to achieve such wildly inflated ambitions. Colonel Dale Eikemeier and Arthur Lykke Jr. Have suggested that effective strategy involves the balancing of ends (desired outcomes), ways (methods), and means (available resources), while limiting risk. At least retrospectively, it boggles the mind that, in 2006-2007, a plurality of political and military thinkers presumed Washington could successfully achieve such an equilibrium in Iraq by military means.
Authors in the book—many of whom have contributed to this symposium—grappled with questions as diverse as the normative and moral meanings of justice, the intricacies of time and transition; and the very conception of armed conflict. Our main conclusion from the book is that it is helpful to think about jus post bellum in three different ways. In order to study the concept, we broke it down into its constituent parts: jus, post, and bellum.
The impact of competition on elephant musth strategies: A game-theoretic model. WITNESS HOW BEEHIVE FENCES CHANGE LIVES AND SAVE ELEPHANTS.
I recount this not simply out of contrition, but to make clear that my commitment to critical comparative law is an outgrowth of my firm belief that the true agents of change in China will be its own citizens. And it is in this spirit that the paper was written. [See generally Jedidiah Kroncke, Law and Development as Anti-Comparative Law, 45 Vand. ] In contrast, I believe that a genuine practice of comparative law can be a crucial practical and moral support to Chinese activists and intellectuals to whom we may feel sympathetic. Further, more often than not the idea that China can be changed through outside expert interventions obfuscates at best and complicates at worst efforts by Chinese activists to engage with foreign interlocutors or learn from foreign legal experience.
The Article explores the paradox in action through the willingness of modern authoritarian regimes, particularly China, to experiment with rule of law reforms, and creatively so in the realm of property rights, while being uniformly repressive of associative labor rights. In this article, Professor Kroncke argues that a fundamental paradox exists in efforts to promote democratization abroad that emphasize property rights to the exclusion of labor rights and that this paradox emerges from the connection between property rights and foreign legal development alongside a renewed emphasis on independent unionization in democratization theory.
In these non-ideal circumstances, Pablo de Greiff has argued measures that are weak in relation to the immensity of their task are more likely to be interpreted as justice initiatives if they help to ground a reasonable perception that their coordinated implementation is a multi-pronged effort to restore or establish anew the force of fundamental norms. Jus post bellum as integrity can recognise these mutually dependent conditions and constitutes a legitimate and coherent non-ideal conception of justice in the aftermath of war and conflict. Three reasons present themselves. First, post-conflict processes are more legitimate if forming part of a coherent whole. Such areas face enormous and challenging tasks because of these conditions and struggle to offer an ideal conception of justice in that context. A distinct case therefore needs to be made that an approach predicated on the unity of value and the desirability of integrity in interpretation should be preferred. The aftermath of conflict presents several social conditions, including an absence of the rule of law, civic trust or social recognition of human dignity, which are shared pre-conditions in areas relevant to jus post bellum such as peace-building, transitional justice, security sector reform.
Here, I will focus on jus post bellum as an interpretive framework, and how examining constitutional peace agreements can inform that function. In my chapter of this volume, I suggest that jus post bellum should be considered as a broad, holistic concept that includes different functions: jus post bellum as providing a body of norms, as an interpretive framework, as a site of coordination, and as a site of discourse. I argue that a multi-faceted concept of jus post bellum can be informed by the norms and practices associated with developing and implementing post-conflict constitutions that arise out of peace agreements (“constitutional peace agreements”).
This post, however, will focus on certain practical issues. I will offer four arguments to suggest that it would be simply counter–intuitive not to recognize that IHL already regulates detentions in NIACs, even though it seems to be explicitly silent on this question. From a theoretical perspective, these writings have raised several interesting arguments. Much has been written about this in the blogosphere (see here, here, here and here by Gabor Rona a few years ago).
This is one of several reasons why I think a North Korea obsession is South Korea’s past, while South Korea’s future is, perhaps counter-intuitively, in a more southwesterly direction than many realize. The Indian Ocean and South China Sea are thus not only important for their own sake, but as a less defined sub-region that offers new types of opportunities and constraints for Northeast Asia’s stalemates.
” While the U. And Europe not to recognize that many of the Syrian denials of consent stem from security concerns involving “terrorists. ) It is also critical to remember that those who are asking the United States and European states to aggressively back the UN and humanitarian NGOs to enter Syria without the government’s consent are asking governments who are openly and actively supporting the Syrian rebellion to overthrow the Syrian government. (For that matter, would Lincoln’s government have allowed British-backed relief groups to enter the southern territories to provide humanitarian assistance based only on Confederate consent. It is hard to imagine how any state would support such a notion: would Yemen allow AQAP to provide independent consent to Saudi Arabian relief agencies to enter Yemeni territory in order to provide humanitarian assistance. And Europeans are themselves deeply concerned about certain terrorist groups operating in Syria, including their own citizens who may return home. And Europeans may disagree on whether all of the individuals designated by the Syrian government are in fact terrorists, the U. Would Lebanon allow Iran to enter southern Lebanon to provide assistance to Hezbollah-held territory. Moreover, despite what seem to be an array of arbitrary and capricious denials of consent by the government of Syria, it would be peculiar, and approaching hypocritical, for the U.
Easterday is a Researcher for the ‘Jus Post Bellum’ project at the Universiteit Leiden and an international justice consultant. [Carsten Stahn is Professor of International Criminal Law and Global Justice and Programme Director of the Grotius Centre for International Studies, Universiteit Leiden. Jens Iverson is a Researcher for the ‘Jus Post Bellum’ project and an attorney specializing in public international law, Universiteit Leiden.